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Abstract
Is electoral behaviour affected by the current challenges of the EU and, if it is, through which channels and mechanisms?
This study offers a cross-national analysis together with a broad understanding of both the crisis phenomenon and elec-
toral behaviour. To investigate this research question appropriately, we first distinguish at the most general level between
the two main behavioural alternatives at play when it comes to electoral behaviour, namely abstention and vote choice.
Second, and no less important, we differentiate between the mechanisms that mediate the relationship between the ‘EU
under stress’ and electoral behaviour, namely egocentric and sociotropic economic voting motivations. Drawing on data
from the European Election Study 2014, our article provides important insights into the study of electoral behaviour in an
EU under stress. First, we are able to show that the multiple crises that have hit the EU have the potential to determine
both turnout and the decision to vote for a Eurosceptic party. Second, different mechanisms are in play for each of the two
behavioural alternatives: Turnout is clearly related to egocentric determinants and thus depends on individuals’ personal
exposure to the financial crisis. Conversely, the decision to vote for a Eurosceptic party is based on a different mechanism.
Voters—without necessarily being personally affected by the crisis—have a higher propensity to vote for a Eurosceptic
party if they perceive their country to be threatened by such an EU under stress. These findings add to a better under-
standing of the EU’s multi-level democracy.
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1. Introduction
Starting with the financial crisis which hit the world in
2007–2008, followed by the economic and the sovereign
debt crisis, the EU has faced numerous events that to-
gether have brought the European system of multi-level
governance into a permanent state of crisis. Although
the ensuing recession was certainly a significant event,
the Brexit referendum and related discussions around
the procedure of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU as
well as continuing debate among EU member states
within the policy field of immigration have also con-
tributed to the air of crisis. In short, the EU is “in the
midst of its worst crisis since its inauguration in 1993”
(Verdun, 2013, p. 45). Scholars have already begun to
investigate the conditions and consequences of such
an EU under permanent stress (e.g., Cramme & Hobolt,
2015). The bottom line is that the multiple crises had
and still have far-reaching implications not just for the
political systems of EU member states but also for the
European level of governance. Moreover, empirical stud-
ies have shown that not only has the political system
been affected but also the dimension of wider EU poli-
tics. Political parties adapt their policy positions towards
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the EU in times of crisis (Braun, Popa, & Schmitt, 2019;
Conti, Hutter, & Nanou, 2018), while citizens adjust their
perceptions of the EU system of multi-level governance
(Braun & Tausendpfund, 2014; Hobolt & Wratil, 2015).
Not only have citizens’ perceptions changed in times of
crisis but so too has their political behaviour. Empirical
studies show that the crisis has consequences for indi-
vidual voting behaviour (Hernández & Kriesi, 2016), al-
though in particular economic effects on incumbent sup-
port are less crisis-driven than has previously been as-
sumed (Talving, 2018). The bulk of empirical studies fo-
cuses on the vote of government andmainstreamparties
as well as Eurosceptic parties in times of crisis, whereas
scholars have traditionally been less interested in voters’
electoral participation. Althoughwe agree that the inves-
tigation of the Eurosceptic vote or respectively the de-
fection frommainstream or government parties is highly
relevant, this is only one possible citizens’ reaction. At
least theoretically, voters can choose between two main
behavioural alternatives. Hirschman (1970) aptly labels
these two basic behavioural alternatives “exit” or “voice”
as possible options if consumers (in our case voters) are
no longer satisfied with the quality of the product (in our
case the EU under stress).
Against this background, the aim of our article is
to provide a comprehensive and systematic theoretical
framework as well as an in-depth empirical study on elec-
toral behaviour in the EU under stress. Since electoral be-
haviour in the EU can best be studied by examining elec-
tions to the European Parliament (EP), we draw on data
from the 2014 European Elections Study (EES; Schmitt,
Hobolt, Popa, Teperoglou, & European Parliament, 2015).
To effectively examine the idea of the EU that has been
much challenged in recent years, we look at the eco-
nomic crisis and study its implications on electoral be-
haviour, namely the two main behavioural alternatives
of abstention and vote choice. To put it simply, our em-
pirical study seeks to investigate whether and how (i.e.,
through which mechanisms) electoral behaviour is af-
fected by an environment in a state of permanent cri-
sis or under stress. In line with major insights from eco-
nomic models of voting (e.g., Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier,
2007), we argue that two different mechanisms are in
play when studying the implications of the series of EU
crises on electoral behaviour. Either individuals decide to
abstain or to cast their vote with reference to their per-
sonal economic situation (‘egocentric voting’), or they
take into account the national economic conditions (‘so-
ciotropic voting’). In order to present a comprehensive
and systematic overview of electoral behaviour in the EU
under stress, we integrate the two behavioural alterna-
tives together with the mechanisms into one analytical
framework. Our findings show that the existence of an
EU under stress has implications for both turnout and
the decision to vote for a Eurosceptic party. Moreover,
different mechanisms are present for each of the two be-
havioural alternatives: Turnout is clearly related to ego-
centric determinants and thus depends on personal ex-
posure to the financial crisis. Conversely, the decision
to vote for a Eurosceptic party is based on a different
mechanism. Voters—without necessarily having been
personally affected by the crisis—have a higher propen-
sity to vote for a Eurosceptic party if they perceive their
country to be threatened by such an EU under stress.
These findings add to a better understanding of EUmulti-
level democracy.
2. Electoral Behaviour in the EU under Stress:
Abstaining or Voting for Eurosceptic Parties
What dowe knowabout electoral behaviour in the EUun-
der stress so far? From a predominantly theoretical per-
spective, the standard model of political participation,
the civic voluntarism model (Verba, Schlozman, & Brady,
1995) postulates that political participation depends on
motivation, mobilisation, and resources. In times of cri-
sis, when material resources become scarcer, political
participation is thus supposed to decrease. According to
Verba and Nie (1972), people with access to the nec-
essary resources are more prone to participate actively
in politics. Conversely, individuals with fewer resources
tend to participate less in political life than others. To
put it differently, “actors require resources to be able
to participate politically” (Kern,Marien, & Hooghe, 2015,
p. 466), primarily because these individuals realise they
have fewer possibilities to exert an influence on poli-
tics. They thus decide not to take part and become in
a sense apathetic with respect to political life. Linking
this argument to the current crisis environment of the
EU, di Mauro (2016) has been able to show that the
economic crisis—one important trigger for the EU un-
der stress—indeed has an effect, albeit limited, on elec-
toral participation.
Not only can electoral participation be affected but
also the choice to vote for a specific party. One likely sce-
nario in this regard is that citizens in an EU under perma-
nent stress vote to a higher degree for Eurosceptic par-
ties to show their discontent with the current situation.
Empirical studies point to an intensification of a broader
trend towards destabilisation within the European party
systems during times of EU crisis—e.g., with higher vote
shares for populist and Eurosceptic parties (Hernández
& Kriesi, 2016). The latter insight dovetails with the find-
ing that citizens behave differently in normal times than
in times of crisis (Kern et al., 2015). Individuals decide
to vote for their preferred mainstream parties in a crisis-
free environment, whereas they tend to avoid choosing
established parties in times of economic hardship be-
cause they have lost their faith in the main actors of the
political system and vote instead for more extreme par-
ties (Hernández & Kriesi, 2016). It has also been shown
that motivations to vote for incumbent parties varied at
different stages of the economic crisis (Okolikj & Quinlan,
2016), but that voters have certainly defected from gov-
ernment parties in times of crisis as a protest against the
EU’s fiscal policies (Magalhães, 2016). In addition, voters
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seem to have been more reactive to government policy
decisions in the post-crisis period than before (Talving,
2017). In contrast to these findings, Talving (2018) has
also shown that economic effects on incumbent support
are surprisingly stable over time,which suggests that eco-
nomic voting is as pronounced during times of crisis as
it is in normal times. Moreover, citizens harmed more by
the crisis have a higher propensity to vote for Eurosceptic
parties (Hobolt, 2015; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016), a ten-
dency which is driven by two main factors: a general dis-
satisfaction with mainstream parties on the one hand
and, on the other, fundamental concerns of voters about
the domestic effects of EU membership or their discon-
tent with the EU’s handling of the various crises (Hobolt,
2015; Hobolt & de Vries, 2016; Treib, 2014).
3. Lacking Resources, Egocentric and Sociotropic
Economic Considerations in View of the ‘EU
under Stress’
To sum up, findings from previous studies suggest that
an environment of crises or, in the case of our study
more precisely, the EU under stress, has important impli-
cations for electoral behaviour, namely abstention and a
Eurosceptic vote. As summarised in Figure 1, we seek to
investigate how (i.e., throughwhichmechanisms) the EU
multi-level system under stress influences the two main
alternatives of electoral behaviour. Beside the fact that
previous studies mainly focused on these behavioural al-
ternatives, we opted for turnout and vote choice as prin-
cipal variables, building on Hirschman’s (1970) general
framework which has been applied successfully for elec-
toral research and in the case of EP elections (Weber,
2011). It suggests that voters can generally choose be-
tween “exit” or “voice.” Applying these two behavioural
alternatives to our research question implies that voters
can either decide to abstain from an election (“exit”) or
they can show their disapproval with the current situa-
tion by voting for Eurosceptic parties (“voice”). Our study
seeks a better understanding of the precise motivation
for each of these decisions in times of permanent cri-
sis. We study in particular the underlying mechanisms
in play: egocentric or sociotropic economic motivations.
The subsequent sections serve to explain in more detail
these mechanisms and their role in the case of electoral
behaviour in the EU under stress. To abstain from elec-
tions as well as to vote for Eurosceptic parties is related
to some degree to the fact that the EU is under stress.
But, to study this link appropriately, we need to take
into account insights from additional scholarly work. To
capture each of the mechanisms appropriately, we draw
both on economic models of voting (Duch & Stevenson,
2008; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2007) as well as on util-
itarian arguments put forward in the literature on EU
attitudes (for a similar approach see Elkink, Quinlan, &
Sinnott, 2019).
‘EU under stress’
Electoral behavior
Vote choice for
Euroscepc
pares
Turnout
Sociotropic
economic
movaons
Egocentric
economic
movaons
Lacking resources
Figure 1. Electoral behaviour in an EU multi-level system under stress.
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Together with the general civic voluntarism model
and the empirical findings reported above, insights from
two additional strands of literature can tell us a lot about
the particular mechanisms in play when economic con-
siderations unfold in the case of electoral behaviour.
First, empirical studies on EU support have highlighted
for a long time the predominant role of utilitarian con-
siderations when determining public attitudes towards
European integration (Eichenberg & Dalton, 2007; Gabel,
1998). Elkink et al. (2019, p. 335) mention in this re-
gard that “sociotropic motivations—an altruistic drive—
are a significantly more potent driver of the voter vis-
à-vis utilitarian motivations.” The latter differentiation
has been inspired by the second strand of literature—
economic voting (Duch & Stevenson, 2008; Lewis-Beck
& Lobo, 2017; Lewis-Beck & Stegmaier, 2007)—which is
also highly relevant to our task of disentangling themech-
anisms behind electoral behaviour. The economic voting
model posits that voters will reward the incumbent gov-
ernment with their vote if the economy is good, and con-
versely punish it by casting their vote for another party
if they perceive their economic environment as less suc-
cessful. Additionally, it is a common claim that individ-
uals either cast their vote with reference to their per-
sonal economic situation, i.e., based on egocentric con-
siderations (‘pocketbook voting’), or they take into ac-
count the perceived or objective national economic con-
ditions (‘sociotropic voting’). In the latter case, voters
behave not in an egocentric way, but display a more al-
truistic and therefore sociotropic behaviour (Lewis-Beck
& Stegmaier, 2007). Important to note, however, re-
search shows that ‘sociotropic voting’ has a greater im-
pact than egocentric pocketbook voting (Lewis-Beck &
Stegmaier, 2013).
Overall, these thoughts from a) the civic voluntarism
model, b) the economic voting literature, as well as c)
insights from utilitarian accounts in the EU support lit-
erature, lead to the following theoretical assumptions:
Based on the theoretical account of the civic voluntarism
model, we assume for the most fundamental type of po-
litical participation—namely, electoral turnout—that in-
dividuals who have suffered personally in times of cri-
sis and economic downturn or who have more generally
experienced the EU under stress are assumed to partic-
ipate less often in elections because they feel unable to
exert any influence on politics. This is a reasonable as-
sumption since unemployment rates have increased in
many, though not all, EU member states in the years
following the financial crisis. Moreover, at least in the
member states that have been hit hardest by the subse-
quent waves of financial, economic, and Euro currency
crises, material resources have become scarcer. In addi-
tion, the literature on EU attitudes and economic vot-
ing theory suggests that economic—egocentric aswell as
sociotropic—considerations apply when voters decide to
vote for a particular party, in our case affecting the vote
for Eurosceptic parties. As such, we have created the fol-
lowing hypothesis:
H1a: The greater the individual exposure to the finan-
cial crisis and its consequences (e.g., experienced
through reduced income, less money, lost job),
the less inclined are respondents to cast a ballot
in EP elections (lack of resources egocentric non-
voting);
H1b: The greater the individual exposure to the finan-
cial crisis and its consequences (e.g., experienced
through reduced income, less money, lost job),
the more inclined are respondents to vote for
Eurosceptic parties (lack of resources egocentric
Eurosceptic voting);
H2: The more citizens perceive the financial crisis and
its consequences as a threat for their country (i.e.,
are dissatisfied with the current and future state
of their national economy), the more inclined they
are to vote for a Eurosceptic party (sociotropic
Eurosceptic voting, individual level);
H3: The more strongly a country has been hit objec-
tively by the financial crisis and its consequences
(e.g., measured via levels of unemployment, gross
domestic product (GDP), national debt), the less
inclined are respondents to cast a ballot in EP elec-
tions and the more inclined are respondents to
vote for a Eurosceptic party (direct non-voting and
Eurosceptic voting).
Altogether, we assume that the financial crisis and its
consequences that marked the starting point of the EU’s
current permanent state of tension has implications for
electoral behaviour (H1 to H3). More specifically, we be-
lieve that different motivations are in play in this re-
gard: A (perceived) lack of resources which is almost
identical to ‘egocentric’ considerations in the perspec-
tive of economic voting theory can be linked theoret-
ically to both abstention and a Eurosceptic vote (H1).
‘Sociotropic’ considerations, in contrast, might in partic-
ular occur in the case of Eurosceptic voting (H2) which is
related to the idea of winners and losers of globalisation
(Kriesi et al., 2008). In short, the assumption is that the
so-called losers of globalisation (and to a similar degree
of European integration) do not benefit from these new
trends but rather fear them. Although transnational co-
operation in general is thus perceived as a threat to their
national environment, these feelings intensify in times
of permanent crisis. Finally, one could of course assume
that the crisis itself has direct implications for electoral
behaviour (H3).
4. Design of the Study
Figure 2 summarises the overall model of our analysis for
the two dependent variables. While H1 and H2 are ded-
icated to testing the individual-level effects of the finan-
cial crisis and its consequences on the two dependent
variables, H3 is formulated to examine the aggregate-
level link. Moreover, to single out the genuine effects of
what we have labelled ‘EU under stress,’ it is necessary
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not only to take into account economic indicators that
shine a light on the crisis itself. We also need to control
for relevant determinants of electoral behaviour as well
as for the particular character of EP elections.
According to classical theories of voting behaviour
(Arzheimer, Evans, & Lewis-Beck, 2017) and vote absten-
tion (Cancela & Geys, 2016; Smets & van Ham, 2013)
traditional determinants of electoral behaviour are po-
litical interest, internal political efficacy, party identifica-
tion, and left–right placement, as well as demographic
features such as education, social class, gender, and age.
With regard to the particular character of EP elections,
we take into account satisfaction with the EU and the na-
tional government. This is important insofar as EP elec-
tions represent a particular set of elections since these
contests are considered to be second-order elections
(Reif & Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt & Teperoglou, 2017)—
mainly because there is less at stake compared to na-
tional first-order elections. Equally important in terms
of EU-level particularities is the individual perception of
responsibility on the part of the EU for the series of
crises (Hobolt & Tilley, 2014). Moreover, in EP elections,
voter turnout is also to a large degree determined by
factors related to the electoral systems of the member
states and factors connected to the EU such as com-
pulsory voting (Mattila, 2003), EU membership dura-
tion (Flickinger & Studlar, 2007) and satisfaction with EU
membership (Steinbrecher & Rattinger, 2012; Stockemer,
2012). Accordingly, we control at the individual level
for socio-demographic background, general political at-
titudes and EU support. At the aggregate level, we take
into account the duration of EU membership, compul-
sory voting, post-communist membership, and the elec-
toral cycle.
In line with the model illustrated in Figure 2 we in-
clude in our analysis individual-level and context-level
variables. Hence, we need to apply a multi-level ap-
proach (Hox, Moerbeek, & Schoot, 2018). This method
estimates both the influence of individual-level and con-
textual factors in a simultaneous and statistically accu-
rate manner. Both dependent variables are binary vari-
ables. Therefore, we use multi-level logistic regression.
Following the logic of hierarchical modelling, we present
a series of models, with each model building upon the
preceding one. Taking as our starting point the ‘empty’
model, which excludes independent variables, we can es-
tablish the variance to be explained for the micro and
macro levels (intra-class correlation). In the next step, we
include the individual variables (H1, H2), before consider-
ing the contextual indicators (H3).
For the empirical analyses, we draw on data from
the EES 2014 (Schmitt et al., 2015). From 30 May to
27 June 2014, a national post-election survey was con-
ducted in eachof the 28member countries of the EU. The
sample size is roughly 1,100 people in each EU member
state, with the exceptions of Cyprus, Luxembourg, and
Malta, where the sample size is 500, as well as the UK
and Germany, where the sample is approximately 1,400
and 1,600 citizens respectively. Overall, 30,064 citizens
across all member states of the EU were interviewed (by
means of a computer assisted personal interview).
Before we start to test our theoretical assumption,
we should shed some light on the dependent variables
of our study: abstention and the choice to vote for a
Eurosceptic party. To map abstention, we use the fol-
lowing question: “EP elections were held on the [date].
For one reason or another, some people in [our coun-
try] did not vote in these elections. Did you yourself
vote in the recent EP elections?” 17,217 respondents
participated in the European election, while 12,778 per-
sons stayed away from the ballot box and 69 respon-
dents answered with “don’t know.” The latter group was
coded as non-voters. Turnout, measured via survey data,
varies considerably between the EU member states (see
Figure 3). Moreover, it becomes obvious that turnout
in EP elections is overestimated when we draw on data
from the EES 2014 (see also Mattila, 2003, p. 453). With
the exception of Belgium and Luxembourg, the official
Individual Level:
Control Variables
H1
H2
Individual Level:
Crisis Indicators
Aggregate Level:
Crisis Indicators
Aggregate Level:
Control Variables
Dependent variables
Turnout (a)
Vote for Euroscepc
Pares (b)
control
control
control
H3
Figure 2. Theoretical hypothesis for the link between electoral behaviour and the ‘EU under stress.’
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Figure 3. Turnout in percentages in the European Election 2014.
turnout is on average 12 percentage points lower than
that based upon the post-election survey. Although this
phenomenon can be clearly classified as ‘over-reporting,’
the correlation between official turnout and our survey
data is very high (r = .89; N = 28). In the end, at least for
the investigation of our research question, the issue of
over-reporting is negligible.
The second dependent variable in our analysis is the
choice to vote for a Eurosceptic party. To classify the na-
tional political parties as Eurosceptic, we use the infor-
mation provided by Hobolt (2015, p. 13; see Table A1
in the Supplementary File). We coded the vote of a
Eurosceptic party as 1 (N = 3,286), whereas the vote of
non-Eurosceptic parties was coded as 0 (N = 13,931);
non-voters were excluded from this particular analytical
step. As in the case of abstention, the Eurosceptic vote
varies strongly between EUmember states (see Figure 4).
While more than 60 percent of voters in Hungary voted
for a Eurosceptic party, the share of Eurosceptic votes
in Malta was 0 percent (as a result, no party in Malta
has been classified as a Eurosceptic party). Again, the
pattern differs between the official results and the find-
ings provided by the EES 2014. What we can learn from
this rather descriptive lesson is that drawing on survey
data alone can lead to an underestimation of the share
of Eurosceptic parties (this is true for all countries ex-
cept Latvia). Nonetheless, the correlation between the
aggregated individual data and the official data is r = .97
(N = 28), whereby the strong correlation indicates that
possible biases are also negligible.
As previously discussed, when it comes to our main
independent variables, we need to distinguish carefully
between factors operating at the individual and the con-
textual level. At the individual level, we use five variables
to capture the individual economic situation in the after-
math of the financial crisis. As indicators for the idea of
egocentric considerations due to lack of resources (H1),
we use three different questions: First, whether the re-
spondent or someone in the household of the respon-
dent has lost his or her job during the last two years;
second, if the household has experienced a decrease in
income during the last two years; third, how often the
respondent faced difficulties in paying bills at the end of
themonth during the last twelvemonths. These three in-
dicators ideallymapdifferent nuances of economic depri-
vation in the aftermath of the crisis. As indicators for ‘so-
ciotropic voting’ (H2), we use the individual perception
of the current national economy and the evaluation of
the general economic situation over the following twelve
months. Higher values indicate a negative perception of
the national economy. To map the implications of the cri-
sis at the contextual level (H3), we use GDP per capita,
the unemployment rate, and the national debt as objec-
tive indicators for the economic situation. In contrast to
previous studies, we have opted not only to use static val-
ues (e.g., the economic situation in 2013) but also to al-
low for a dynamic perspective taking into account chang-
ing values over time (2008 to 2013). Furthermore, we in-
clude a dummy variable to indicate whether a country is
a member of the Eurozone (yes = 1) or a bailout country
(yes = 1).
In addition to the economic variables, empirical re-
search on turnout and vote choice suggests a number
of other potentially influential factors, especially at the
individual level. Therefore, we include several variables
designed to control for other potentially confounding fac-
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Figure 4. Eurosceptic vote in percentages in the European Election 2014.
tors: the individual perception of responsibility of the EU
for the current economic situation; satisfaction with the
EU and the national government; political interest, inter-
nal political efficacy, party identification, and the left–
right placement as classical determinants of turnout and
voting. Finally, we consider demographic features such
as education, social class, gender, and age. At the macro
level, we control for compulsory voting, election cycle,
duration of EU membership and communist history.
All indicators are coded identically with low values
indicating low levels and high values indicating high lev-
els of the respective characteristics. All variables are
rescaled—the lowest value is 0 and the highest is 1.
Whereas in the case of turnout, we consider all member
states of the EU (N = 28), in the case of the Eurosceptic
vote, Malta will be excluded due to the lack of a
Eurosceptic party in this country (N = 27). Descriptive
information concerning the independent variables can
be gathered from Table A2 in the Supplementary File
and the question wording is also documented in the
Supplementary File’s Table A3.
5. Empirical Analysis
Following the logic of hierarchical modelling, we present
a series of models, where each builds on the preced-
ing one. Starting with the empty model, the share of
cross-national variance on the total variance amounts
to 14.6 percent (turnout) and 21.8 percent (vote for
a Eurosceptic party). The estimates also indicate that
turnout and the vote for a Eurosceptic party depend
on both individual- and context-level indicators. In a fur-
ther step, we consider the effects of our core individual-
level determinants of vote abstention and vote for a
Eurosceptic party. The results of the individual models
are presented in Table 1 via stepwise models: M1 dis-
plays the effects for egocentric considerations only; M2
displays the effects for sociotropic considerations only;
and M3 combines the two models into one final model.
The coefficients in M1 confirm the impact of egocen-
tric considerations due to lack of resources (H1) and can
be interpreted as follows: Egocentric considerations de-
crease electoral participation (H1a) and raise the likeli-
hood of voting for a Eurosceptic party (H1a). Moreover,
viewed through the lens of the notion of sociotropic vot-
ing (M2), our results are interesting in two ways: First,
a respondent with negative current perception and/or
future evaluation of the economic situation is less likely
to cast a ballot in the EP elections; second, a negative
current perception and/or future evaluation of the eco-
nomic situation also increases the likelihood of voting
for a Eurosceptic party (H2). In summary, our results
thus support the idea of both sociotropic and egocen-
tric voting.
For ease of interpretation, we now include our
individual-level control variables in the subsequent
model. The key message of the results in Model 3 in
Table 1 is that under the influence of relevant individ-
ual characteristics, the effects of the economic indicators
are weaker than in Models 1 and 2 and sometimes no
longer significant, albeit without changing substantively.
Put simply, the economic indicators continue to exert an
independent effect, whereby the loss of a job and prob-
lems in paying bills reduces the likelihood of electoral
participation. This pattern clearly confirms our first hy-
pothesis (H1), showing that egocentric voting has a sig-
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Table 1. Individual models of electoral participation and the vote for a Eurosceptic party.
Electoral participation Vote for Eurosceptic party
M1 M2 M3 M1 M2 M3
Individual level
H1: lost job (yes = 1) −.26*** −.15*** .14** .08
H1: decrease in income (yes = 1) −.00 .05 .17** .04
H1: paying bills (ref. no problems)
occasionally −.36*** −.11** .12* −.02
most of the time −.62*** −.23*** .38*** .06
H2: bad economic evaluation (now) −.40*** −.07 .47*** .10
H2: bad economic evaluation (future) −.62*** −.15 .92*** .55 ∗ ∗∗
EU responsibility economic .39*** −.15
EU (ref. dk)
dissatisfied −.08 .55***
satisfied .18*** −.23**
National government (ref. dk)
dissatisfied −.06 .44***
satisfied −.04 −.16
Political interest 1.85*** .21*
Internal efficacy .11 −.16
Party identification (yes = 1) .63*** .64***
Left–right scale (ref. middle)
left (0–3) .15** .27***
right (7–10) .29*** .50***
don’t know/refusal −.24*** −.18
Education (ref. middle)
low −.16*** .03
high .17*** −.15**
Level in society .62*** −.64***
Gender (male = 1) −.12*** .26***
Age 1.55*** −.79***
Random effects
Contextual level .56 .54 .54 .91 .95 .94
Intra-class correlations .145 .141 .141 .212 .225 .222
Akaike Information Criterion 33163.5 33328.57 29003.27 13588.1 13489.85 12648.39
Bayesian Information Criterion 33212.68 33361.36 29199.99 13633.93 13520.39 12831.64
N individual (countries) 26.804 (28) 26.804 (28) 26.804 (28) 15.297 (27) 15.297 (27) 15.297 (27)
Notes: Multi-level logistic regression. Coefficients are not standardised; all variables are rescaled (lowest value is 0; highest value is 1).
Coefficients indicate the change associated with moving from the lowest to the highest value. Significance level: * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01;
*** p < 0.001. Source: Schmitt et al. (2015).
nificant impact only on electoral participation, but not on
the vote for Eurosceptic parties. In contrast to this obser-
vation, a negative future evaluation of the economic situ-
ation increases the likelihood of voting for a Eurosceptic
party which in turn confirms our second hypothesis (H2),
that the mechanism of sociotropic voting is relevant in
the case of voting for Eurosceptic parties. Finally, the ef-
fects of the control variables on electoral participation
and the vote for a Eurosceptic party are in line with pre-
vious research. Perception of responsibility on the part
of the EU regarding the economic situation has a posi-
tive effect on electoral participation, but the effect on
party vote is statistically not significant. Satisfaction with
the EU also promotes turnout, whereas being dissatis-
fied with the EU and the national government fosters
voting for a Eurosceptic party. The findings confirm the
idea that national politics has an impact on voting be-
haviour in EP elections, whereby higher political interest,
education, and party identification have a positive effect
on turnout.
In the next step, we include the context-level vari-
ables in our model in order to detect whether the cri-
sis also has a direct impact (H3), in addition to the ef-
fects via the individual level already shown. At this point,
we distinguish between the current economic situation
and a dynamic perspective. Initially, we consider the in-
dicators separately in the models, i.e., we estimated 24
different multi-level models, one model for each indi-
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cator. Individual variables are always included but not
shown for reasons of clarity (compared to Model 3,
the results of the individual-level indicators remain sta-
ble). The results of the multi-level regression are pre-
sented in Table 2. Two crisis indicators show statisti-
cally significant effects. We can see that the greater
the national debt, the more citizens cast their ballot in
EP elections. A fast economic recovery after the eco-
nomic crisis—operationalised by the change in GDP—
reduces the likelihood of a Eurosceptic voting decision.
With an eye to the control variables at the contextual
level, our findings suggest that compulsory voting and a
longermembership in the EU increases turnout, whereas
a communist heritage reduces electoral participation.
Moreover, in Eurozone countries, the probability of vot-
ing for a Eurosceptic party is somewhat lower than in
non-Eurozone members.
In a final step, we merge the significant context-level
indicators into one multi-level model (M5; Table 3). The
results of the multi-level regression show that compul-
sory voting has a positive effect and a communist her-
itage has a negative effect on electoral participation.
National debt no longer has a statistically significant ef-
fect. In terms of the vote for a Eurosceptic party, we find
two statistically significant effects: First, a fast economic
recovery after the economic crisis reduces the likelihood
of a Eurosceptic voting decision; and second, the likeli-
hood of voting for a Eurosceptic party is lower in coun-
tries of the Eurozone comparedwith non-Eurozone coun-
tries. To sum up, our final results corroborate that there
is indeed a direct relationship between the financial cri-
sis and its consequences and electoral behaviour (H3).
Nevertheless, this holds true only in the case of the vote
for a Eurosceptic party, but not for electoral participation.
What does this mean substantively? First, in cases where
a country is a member of the Eurozone, the likelihood of
voting for a Eurosceptic party is lower. Second, the faster
the economic recovery of a country, the less inclined are
respondents to vote for a Eurosceptic party.
6. Conclusion
The financial crisis which turned quickly into a global
economic crisis was followed by severe political conse-
quences. This led to a certain transformation of the EU
multi-level system, but also the dimension of EU politics.
Our study adds to a growing literature on EU politics il-
lustrating that not only citizens’ perceptions towards the
Table 2. Individual and contextual fixed effects models of turnout and vote in the European election 2014.
M4 (Electoral participation) M4 (Vote for Eurosceptic party)
GDP (2013) .92 −1.11
Δ GDP (2008–2013) .33 −1.55#
Unemployment rate (2013) .52 .71
Δ Unemployment rate (2008–2013) .73 .75
National debt (2013) 1.40* 1.29
Δ National debt (2008–2013) .26 .17
Bailout countries .52 .19
Member of the Euro area .29 −.71#
Duration of EU membership .74# −.04
Compulsory voting 1.02** −.55
Post-communist member −.81** −.19
Cycle −.61 .47
Notes: Variables at the individual level (Model 3) are included. Significance level: # p < 0.10; * p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01.
Table 3. Individual and contextual fixed effects models of turnout and Eurosceptic vote in the European election 2014.
M5 (Electoral participation) M5 (Vote for Eurosceptic party)
Δ GDP (2008–2013) ./. −1.78*
National debt (2013) .38 ./.
Member of the Euro area ./. −.81*
Duration of EU membership −.07 ./.
Compulsory voting .72* ./.
Post-communist member −.59# ./.
Intra-class correlations .089 .172
Akaike Information Criterion 28996.94 12643.98
Bayesian Information Criterion 29266.44 12842.5
N individual (countries) 26.804 (28) 15.297 (27)
Notes: Variables at the individual level (Model 3) are included. Significance level: # p < 0.10; * p < 0.05.
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EU but also different types of electoral behaviour in EP
elections have been and are still being affected by these
turbulent times, to be more specific the EU which is cur-
rently under stress. While most of the conventional de-
terminants still hold true, our findings most importantly
show that the crisis and its implications indeed have an
independent effect on electoral behaviour as the crisis
has provoked EU citizens to participate to a lesser de-
gree in the 2014 EP elections and increased the vote for
Eurosceptic parties. Moreover, our empirical study en-
ables us to get a better idea of the precise mechanisms
in play. As hypothesised, lacking resources and there-
fore the fact that the individual life of a person is af-
fected by the crisis—a phenomenon which we labelled
‘lack of resources egocentric non-voting’ (H1)—indeed
has an impact on electoral participation, whereas these
egocentric considerations do not affect the decision to
vote for a Eurosceptic party. In contrast, the mere per-
ception of worsening economic conditions, i.e., the idea
of ‘sociotropic’ voting (H2) as well as some objective in-
dicators of the crisis (H3) affect the decision to vote for
a Eurosceptic party, but not the non-participation in the
2014 EP elections. What does this pattern tell us? A citi-
zen may be individually affected by the crisis and its eco-
nomic and political consequences, but does not (auto-
matically) vote for a Eurosceptic party. Instead of voting
for a Eurosceptic party, in that case he or she decides not
to vote at all. Moreover, the ‘mere existence’ of the crisis
in a country as well as its perception—but not necessar-
ily whether an individual feels personally affected by the
crisis—heightens the propensity to vote for Eurosceptic
parties. This could indeed be interpreted as an intensifi-
cation of a broader trend towards destabilisation within
the European party systems (Hernández & Kriesi, 2016).
Instead of voting for established parties in times of eco-
nomic hardship, voters make their choice for parties out-
side themainstream since they have lost their faith in the
main actors of the political system.
The findings of our study are not only of interest for
scholars of voting behaviour, but will also further the
understanding of EU multi-level politics. To gain a dif-
ferent perspective beyond the findings reported above,
Figure 5 maps the entire process from a multi-level
point of view. A European-wide event, the financial cri-
sis followed by the Euro currency crisis, hit most of the
member states, but not all of them equally hard. A few
years later, the 2014 EP elections took place and, as our
findings indicate, this crisis and its implications affected
‘EU under stress’
Electoral behavior
Composion of
the European
Parliament
Vote choice for
Euroscepc
pares
Turnout
Sociotropic
economic
movaons
Egocentric
economic
movaons
Lacking resources
Events at the EU-level
of governance
Naonal level polics
in elecons at the
EU-level
Naonal level polics
in elecons at the
EU-level
EU-level polics
Figure 5. Implications of electoral behaviour in an EU multi-level system under stress.
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individual-level electoral behaviour (see in more detail
the introduction to this thematic issue, Braun, Gross, &
Rittberger, 2020). To be more specific, the national econ-
omy, affected by a European crisis, is related to the out-
come of the EP elections. Although these elections take
place at the European level, they are widely viewed as
being second-order national elections (Reif & Schmitt,
1980)—and this second-order character still holds true
for the 2014 EP elections (Schmitt & Teperoglou, 2015).
This means that EP elections might be different from na-
tional elections since they produce different results and
always need to be interpreted with an eye to national
elections. Nevertheless, in the end the results are mean-
ingful for the two electoral levels: the EU level since the
composition of the EP represents the result of the EP
elections; and the national level as the EP elections are
always to a certain degree the test balloons for national
first-order elections.
The lesson we can thus draw from our study beyond
the undoubtedly interesting mechanisms in operation is
that electoral behaviour in the EU multi-level system is
far from independent from the different levels in play.
Accordingly, each of these levels needs to be taken into
account when investigating electoral behaviour (but see
also Golder, Lago, Blais, Gidengil, &Gschwend, 2017; Reif
& Schmitt, 1980; Schmitt, Sanz, Braun, & Teperoglou,
2020) or party politics in the EU (Braun & Schmitt, 2018).
The 2019 EP elections should provide scholars of EU
politics with a fertile resource for appropriately study-
ing these and related mechanisms regarding electoral
and party politics. Nonetheless, we do not have any rea-
sons to expect a completely different pattern for each
of the described mechanisms in the 2019 EP elections.
The slightly higher levels in turnout could be interpreted
by a decrease in ‘egocentric’ considerations whereas the
unabated high levels of Eurosceptic vote should still be
related to ‘sociotropic’ considerations.
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